Pak Datacom has come under scrutiny over its decision to move satellite-based connectivity for the National Bank of Pakistan and other institutions from a PakSat-based arrangement to Yahsat infrastructure, after a former company chief raised concerns about the security implications of hosting critical connectivity outside Pakistan.
The concerns were raised by former Pak Datacom CEO Brigadier (Retired) Syed Zulfiqar Ali in a letter to the secretary of Pakistan’s Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication.
According to the letter, Pak Datacom had provided satellite-based backup connectivity to more than 400 National Bank of Pakistan branches for the past five years using VSAT hubs in Karachi and Islamabad connected through the PakSat satellite.
The former CEO said the network has recently been shifted to Yahsat, a UAE-based satellite operator, with the associated hub also located in the UAE.
Former CEO raises concerns over offshore satellite infrastructure
Ali argued that moving both the satellite capacity and hub infrastructure outside Pakistan creates potential security risks for sensitive public-sector communications.
He highlighted the National Bank of Pakistan in particular because of its role in maintaining government accounts.
Pak Datacom reportedly uses a virtual private network over Yahsat infrastructure, but Ali maintained that an indigenous satellite network would provide greater control over sensitive communications.
These concerns represent the assessment of the former CEO and have not been independently substantiated in the source material.
The source also does not provide a response from Pak Datacom, Yahsat, NBP or the Ministry of IT and Telecommunication addressing the allegations.
Recommendation calls for return to PakSat
Ali has recommended that Pak Datacom be instructed to move the National Bank of Pakistan, Oil and Gas Development Company and Accountant General Pakistan Revenues networks back to dedicated domestic satellite infrastructure.
His proposal calls for the networks to use PakSat, with VSAT hubs established in Karachi.
The argument centres on technological sovereignty and control over communications infrastructure supporting institutions considered strategically important to the state.
Satellite networks are commonly used as backup connectivity for organisations requiring service availability in locations where terrestrial networks may be unavailable or where redundancy is considered essential.
Pak Datacom has extensive public-sector exposure
Pak Datacom is listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange and employs around 160 people.
Telecom Foundation holds a 55% stake in the company, while the remaining 45% is held by public shareholders.
Telecom Foundation operates under the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication, giving the ministry significant influence over Pak Datacom through its majority shareholder.
The source states that MoITT Secretary Zarar Hasham is chairman of Telecom Foundation, while Pak Datacom is chaired by Zomma Mohiyuddin, president and CEO of Telecom Foundation.
Company supports sensitive government organisations
Pak Datacom has longstanding relationships with public-sector organisations including the National Database and Registration Authority, OGDCL, AGPR and National Logistics Corporation.
Its work includes the provision and support of VSAT equipment and satellite communication networks.
Because some of these customers operate sensitive government infrastructure, security clearance of the company, its management and relevant personnel is required under applicable procedures.
That broader public-sector role is what makes the choice of satellite infrastructure more strategically significant than a conventional enterprise connectivity decision.
Why this matters
The issue highlights a wider question around where critical national communications infrastructure should be hosted and how much dependence governments should place on foreign-operated platforms.
Satellite connectivity can provide valuable resilience, particularly as a backup to terrestrial networks, but for institutions handling sensitive government or financial operations, control over hubs, routing and infrastructure jurisdiction can become an important policy consideration.
For Pakistan, the debate is therefore not simply about which satellite provider offers better connectivity. It is about how cybersecurity, resilience, sovereignty and operational control should be balanced when public-sector networks depend on infrastructure outside the country.
Editor’s note
The key point is that the security concern has been raised by a former Pak Datacom executive, not established as a confirmed breach or vulnerability.
That distinction matters.
A foreign-operated satellite and offshore hub do not automatically mean a network is insecure, particularly where encryption, VPNs and appropriate security controls are in place. At the same time, infrastructure jurisdiction and physical control can become important considerations for government and financial networks.
The policy question for Pakistan is therefore whether critical communications should be required to remain on nationally controlled satellite and ground infrastructure, even when commercial alternatives are available.
